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From 1991 to 2003, the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in HMOs and other forms of Medicaid
managed care (MMC) increased from 11 percent to 58 percent. This increase was largely driven by
state and local mandates that required most Medicaid recipients to enroll in an MMC plan. Theoretically,
it is ambiguous whether the shift from fee-for-service into managed care would lead to an increase
or a reduction in Medicaid spending. This paper investigates this effect using a data set on state and
local level MMC mandates and detailed data from CMS on state Medicaid expenditures. The findings
suggest that shifting Medicaid recipients from fee-for-service into MMC did not reduce Medicaid
spending in the typical state.  However, the effects of the shift varied significantly across states as
a function of the generosity of the state’s baseline Medicaid provider reimbursement rates. These results
are consistent with recent research on managed care among the privately insured, which finds that
















The Medicaid program currently provides health insurance to more than 50 million low-
income U.S. residents. Expenditures are jointly financed by the federal and state governments, 
and total program expenditures were $390 billion in 2009 (CMS, 2010). Each state administers 
its own Medicaid program and has some latitude with respect to eligibility rules, which services 
are covered, and how generously to reimburse health care providers. States also have flexibility 
in how they administer the benefit, with many opting to contract with health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) and other managed care organizations (MCOs) to coordinate and finance 
care for Medicaid recipients.  
The usual motivation for Medicaid managed care (MMC) contracting is that it will allow 
states to improve access to and quality of care, while also reducing Medicaid expenditures. By 
2008, more than 70 percent of Medicaid recipients were enrolled in some form of managed care 
(KFF, 2010a). The corresponding share in the early 1990s was just 10 percent. The increases in 
MMC enrollment during this period were largely driven by state and local mandates that required 
certain categories of Medicaid recipients to enroll in a managed care plan. 
In this paper, we use data for all fifty states and the District of Columbia to investigate 
the effect of MMC contracting on Medicaid expenditures.  Theoretically, one might expect 
MMC contracting to reduce program expenditures, as health insurers would have a strong 
financial incentive to reduce the use of unnecessary treatments, to improve the coordination of 
medical care, and to keep patients healthy. On the other hand, Medicaid’s provider 
reimbursement rates are generally much lower than those for commercial insurers. Thus even if 
insurers succeed in reducing the utilization of medical care, spending might increase if insurers 
reimbursed health care providers at higher rates than the fee-for-service Medicaid program.   3
Indeed, previous work has found that the key channel through which managed care reduces 
spending in the private health insurance market is by negotiating lower provider prices (Cutler et 
al, 2000; Dor et al, 2004; Shen and Melnick, 2006).  
Previous work on the effect of MMC on Medicaid expenditures has focused on individual 
states, in most cases over relatively short time periods, rather than considering all states 
simultaneously. The results from this research provide mixed evidence, with some studies 
suggesting that MMC increases Medicaid spending and others finding the opposite. Of course, 
the results from any one state may not generalize to the nation as a whole, as each state’s 
Medicaid program has unique features that might influence its benefits from MMC contracting. 
Thus it is ultimately an empirical question whether the shift of Medicaid recipients from 
traditional fee-for-service into managed care plans has on average reduced the strain on state 
budgets and also whether this effect varies across states. 
Medicaid recipients who choose to enroll in MMC plans are likely to differ in both 
observable and unobservable ways from those who remain in traditional fee-for-service 
Medicaid (Glied et al, 1997). Thus to reliably estimate the effect on Medicaid spending, one 
needs a plausibly exogenous source of variation in MMC enrollment. For this we utilize a rich 
source of data from the Urban Institute regarding state and local mandates that required Medicaid 
recipients to enroll in an HMO or some other form of managed care. This data set allows us to 
identify which counties in the U.S. had an MMC mandate in effect for each year from 1991 to 
2001, and we update this data through 2003. Furthermore, this data provides information on the 
type of mandate, distinguishing counties that require recipients to enroll in HMOs from those 
who require enrollment in primary care case management (PCCM). This additional information 
allows us to estimate whether the effect of MMC varies across different types of managed care.   4
We merge this data to administrative data for the same time period from the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) on Medicaid enrollment, MMC enrollment, and 
Medicaid expenditures. This data is available annually at the state level,
1 and thus we aggregate 
the Urban Institute data to the state level by weighting each county by its share of the state’s 
population in each year. The expenditure data contains both total Medicaid spending and 
spending by category, and thus we can explore how the effect of managed care enrollment differs 
across type of spending. During the time period that we consider, the fraction of Medicaid 
recipients enrolled in managed care plans increased from 11 percent to 58 percent. 
Using these two data sources, we first estimate the effect of state and local MMC 
mandates on the fraction of Medicaid recipients in a managed care plan. Our key identifying 
assumption in this first set of analyses and all subsequent ones is that the timing of the mandates 
is orthogonal to other factors that would influence Medicaid expenditures. Our findings indicate 
that, for every 10 Medicaid recipients “exposed” to an MMC mandate, there is an increase of 
approximately 4 in the number of MMC enrollees. The relationship is not one-for-one for at least 
three reasons. First, some Medicaid recipients are already enrolled in voluntary MMC programs 
at the time of the mandates. Second, certain categories of Medicaid recipients are frequently 
exempt from the MMC mandates. And finally, some Medicaid recipients who are subject to the 
mandate do not end up enrolling, perhaps because they are granted an exception or because there 
is a lag between newly enrolling in Medicaid and being enrolled in an MMC plan. 
                                                 
1 CMS currently has micro-level Medicaid claims and enrollment data, with the specific time periods for each state 
summarized here: https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidDataSourcesGenInfo/07_MAXGeneralInformation.asp 
Medicaid data for all states are available beginning in 1999 but many states are missing data in previous years. 
Unfortunately, there is no nationally representative sample of Medicaid claims and enrollment data (as there is for 
Medicare) and thus it is necessary to obtain individual state-level files. For each state*year combination, there are 
five files (inpatient, outpatient, long-term care, prescription drugs, and enrollment). Similar data for the 1993 to 
2001 period was used in Duggan (2004) to estimate the effect of MMC in just one state (California).   5
We next investigate the effect of the mandate-induced increases in MMC enrollment on 
the composition of Medicaid spending. Our findings indicate that increases in MMC enrollment 
are, as expected, significantly negatively related with the share of Medicaid spending going 
directly to health care providers such as hospitals and physicians and positively related to the 
share of payments going to managed care organizations. The effect is entirely driven by HMO 
mandates, as these organizations typically finance most of the care themselves, rather than by 
other types of MMC such as primary care case management. Among health care providers, the 
effect is especially strong for hospitals, physicians, and pharmacies. Interestingly, we estimate no 
effect for the share of spending going to nursing homes, reflecting the fact that most state 
Medicaid programs have kept their nursing home residents within fee-for-service. 
In our third set of empirical analyses, we investigate the effect of the mandate-induced 
increases in MMC enrollment on Medicaid expenditures. Our baseline estimates suggest that the 
average effect on Medicaid spending of shifting recipients from FFS to managed care is close to 
zero. This result holds for both HMO contracting and other types of MMC, and suggests that the 
policy-induced shift of millions of Medicaid recipients from FFS to managed care during our 
study period did little to reduce the strain on the typical state’s budget. 
However, our evidence also suggests that the expenditure effect varies significantly with 
the generosity of a state’s Medicaid provider reimbursement. More specifically, in states where 
Medicaid provider reimbursement is very low relative to commercial reimbursement, MMC 
contracting seems to increase Medicaid spending. The opposite is true in those states with 
relatively generous Medicaid reimbursement. This suggests that it is difficult for states to achieve 
cost savings through MMC contracting if their provider reimbursement rates are initially very 
low relative to rates negotiated by private health insurers in their state.   6
The results in this paper take on additional significance when one considers that many 
states are currently expanding MMC to more of their Medicaid recipients. For example, recent 
survey evidence indicates that at least twenty states are planning to expand the reach of their 
Medicaid managed care programs in the near future (KFF, 2010c). Additionally, Medicaid 
enrollment is projected to increase substantially during the next several years as a result of the 
recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). The Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) projects that PPACA will, by 2016, increase Medicaid enrollment by 16 
million relative to the no-reform baseline (CBO, 2010), while CMS projects an increase of 23 
million (CMS, 2010). It is plausible that the vast majority of these new recipients will be enrolled 
in MMC plans. 
When one considers the budget difficulties that many state governments are currently 
confronting, it is likely that state policymakers will be looking for strategies to control the 
growth rate of Medicaid expenditures in the years ahead. The results in this paper suggest that 
Medicaid managed care is most likely to reduce spending in those states with relatively generous 
provider reimbursement rates. This is consistent with recent evidence from the private health 
insurance market that managed care achieves much of its savings through lower prices rather 
than through reduced quantities (Cutler et al, 2000).
2 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two we provide background on the 
growth in both MMC enrollment and in Medicaid expenditures during our study period and how 
this varies across states. Section three provides a brief overview of the previous literature on 
managed care generally and Medicaid managed care specifically. We outline our identification 
                                                 
2 Earlier evidence did find large reductions in utilization from the HMO model. For example, the results from the 
RAND Health Insurance experiment indicated that inpatient utilization was significantly lower among those 
randomized to an HMO plan (Manning et al, 1987). This experiment was conducted in the mid-1970s.   7
strategy in section four and present our empirical results in section five. Section six discusses the 
implications of our results and possible avenues for future research. 
 
2. The Growth in MMC Enrollment from 1991 to 2003 
  In 1991 and as shown in Table 1, just 10.6 percent of Medicaid recipients were enrolled 
in a managed care plan. Most (7.4 percentage points) of this enrollment was in HMOs and other 
prepaid health plans. These plans are typically paid a fixed amount per member per month, and 
are responsible for choosing a network of health care providers, negotiating reimbursement rates, 
and managing the care of their enrollees. The key feature of the HMO payment model is that the 
plan is at risk for the cost of their enrollees’ medical care. If enrollees’ costs turn out to be higher 
than anticipated, the MMC plan does not receive additional reimbursement. Because of this, 
HMOs and other prepaid health plans have a strong financial incentive to reduce the utilization 
of unnecessary or low-value treatments and to include relatively low-priced hospitals, 
physicians, and other health care providers in their network. 
  A less comprehensive form of managed care used by many states during our study period 
is primary care case management (PCCM). Under this model, a primary care physician is paid a 
fixed amount per member per month to coordinate care for MMC enrollees. In contrast to the 
HMO model, under PCCM the physician is not at financial risk for the cost of their patients’ care 
and does not negotiate rates with health care providers. However, the physician can manage both 
the quantity and the kind of medical care that enrollees receive, and thus can affect Medicaid 
expenditures. In this baseline year, just 3.2 percent of Medicaid recipients were in PCCM.   8
  Many of the Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC during our baseline year were 
required to do so by state and/or local mandates.
3 More specifically and as shown in Table 1, 5.9 
percent of Medicaid recipients resided in a county with an MMC mandate in effect in 1991. 
These mandates did not typically apply to all Medicaid recipients, which often excluded the 
elderly and disabled. When measured in terms of recipients affected, approximately half of the 
mandates (3.0 percent out of 5.9 percent) required enrollment in an HMO or similar prepaid 
health plan. The remaining mandates were a mixture of those requiring PCCM enrollment and 
those allowing a choice between a PCCM-type plan and an HMO-type plan. Given that the 
mandate percentages are substantially lower than the actual enrollment shares, it is clear that 
much of the MMC enrollment in 1991 was in voluntary MMC programs. 
  Table 2 sheds some light on the extent to which MMC enrollment varied across states in 
1991. The median state had just 3.8 percent of its Medicaid recipients enrolled in an MMC plan 
in this baseline year, and more than one-third of states had exactly zero MMC enrollees. Thus 
while MMC enrollment was high in states such as Arizona, Colorado, and Utah, it was 
uncommon in most states. Consistent with this, the vast majority of states (39 out of 51) did not 
have any MMC mandates in effect in 1991, and thus MMC enrollment was voluntary in most 
states with any MMC penetration. 
  The reach of MMC mandates grew substantially during the next twelve years. As shown 
in the final column of Table 2, the majority of states (29 out of 51) had some type of MMC 
mandate in effect in all of their counties in 2003. Only six states did not have any MMC 
mandates in this year. We estimate that 78 percent of all Medicaid recipients in the U.S. resided 
in a county with an MMC mandate in 2003. As shown in Table 1, weighting each mandate by the 
                                                 
3 We obtained information on state and county-level MMC mandates in each year from Urban Institute county-level 
surveys. These mandates are typically set at the state level but often vary across counties (thus we refer to them as 
“state and local mandates”). See the Data Appendix for more details on the Urban Institute surveys.   9
county population, most required enrollment in an HMO or similar prepaid health plan. The 
remaining mandates were split approximately equally between those that required enrollment in 
a PCCM and those that allowed a choice between an HMO type plan and a PCCM type plan.  
Figure 1 gives some insight into the variation across states in both the timing and the 
ultimate reach of MMC mandates by plotting the share of Medicaid recipients with a mandate in 
their county in each year from 1991 to 2003 in five selected states.  Massachusetts put MMC 
mandates in effect statewide beginning in 1992 while, on the opposite extreme, the state of 
Illinois did not have mandates in effect in any of their counties during our study period. Florida 
started to introduce MMC mandates in 1993 and had extended them statewide by 1996. The state 
of California gradually introduced MMC mandates from 1994 through 1999 but 15 percent of 
Medicaid recipients remained unaffected by MMC mandates at the end of our study period. The 
state of Nebraska introduced MMC mandates that affected approximately half of Medicaid 
recipients in 1997 but did not extend these mandates further in the next six years. 
An examination of the data on actual MMC enrollment in 2003 displayed in Table 2 
reveals a relatively close correspondence between it and the share of Medicaid recipients 
residing in a county with a mandate. For example, the six states with no MMC mandates in 2003 
all have MMC enrollment below 15 percent in that year. None of the remaining forty-five states 
enrolled less than 28 percent of their Medicaid recipients in MMC in 2003. 
  It is worth noting that the actual share of Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC in 2003 
(58.4 percent) is substantially lower than the estimated share residing in a county with an MMC 
mandate in that same year (77.9 percent).  This is true for at least three reasons. First, many 
categories of Medicaid recipients are not subject to the mandates. For example, the aged, blind, 
and disabled individuals who qualify for Medicaid through their receipt of federal Supplemental   10
Security Income (SSI) benefits are often excluded from the MMC mandates. Second, there is 
often a lag between an individual becoming newly eligible for Medicaid and her being enrolled 
in an MMC plan. And finally, some individuals who are subject to the mandate receive an 
exemption and thus remain in traditional FFS. 
  The growth in MMC enrollment summarized above coincided with a substantial increase 
in the share of Medicaid spending accounted for by payments to MMC plans. As shown in Table 
3, just 2.8 percent of Medicaid spending was paid to MMC plans in 1991. During the subsequent 
years, this steadily increased, reaching 9.8 percent in 1997 and 16.5 percent by 2003. During this 
same period, the share of Medicaid spending going directly to hospitals, physicians, and long-
term care facilities fell substantially, with these three accounting for 75.1 percent of Medicaid 
spending in 1991 versus just 47.1 percent in 2003. 
  Given that 58.4 percent of Medicaid recipients were enrolled in MMC in 2003, it is to 
some extent surprising that the payments to managed care plans accounted for just 16.5 percent 
of program spending in this year. There are three primary explanations for this. First, MMC 
mandates typically excluded Medicaid recipients with the highest utilization and expenditures, 
such as the elderly and disabled.
4 Second, many of the MMC enrollees are in primary care case 
management, which is unlikely to produce any sharp increases in managed care payments.   
Third, some states “carve out” certain services from their MMC contracts so that they would 
continue to reimburse, for example, long-term care facilities on a fee-for-service basis.  
And of course, another possible explanation is that states are able to reduce Medicaid 
spending by shifting recipients from FFS into MMC, and thus MMC enrollees account for a 
smaller share of spending than they would if they were in fee-for-service. Regardless of the 
                                                 
4 While accounting for just one-fourth of Medicaid recipients in 2007, the elderly and disabled accounted for 67 
percent of Medicaid spending in that same year (KFF, 2010b).   11
explanation, when considering the possible effect of MMC on Medicaid expenditures, it is 
important to keep in mind that the plans accounted for just one-sixth of total program 
expenditures in the final year of our study period. 
  Another important factor to consider in the analyses below is the variation across states 
with respect to both the level and the growth rate of Medicaid spending per recipient during our 
study period.  Weighting each state equally, average Medicaid spending per recipient rose from 
$6,217 in 1991 to $8,084 in 2003 (in 2010 dollars).
5 This represents an annual growth rate of 2.2 
percent in real Medicaid spending per recipient.  Of course, given Medicaid expansions, changes 
in economic conditions, and other factors during this period, the characteristics of Medicaid 
recipients are changing substantially over time. 
There is substantial variation across states with respect to the level of spending in each 
year, as shown in Table 4. For example, Medicaid spending per recipient in New York was twice 
as high as average Medicaid spending in 1991 but grew by just 0.6 percent per year during the 
next twelve years. In contrast, Medicaid spending in California was 49 percent lower than 
average Medicaid spending in 1991 but grew by 5.4 percent during the next twelve years. 
Despite these very different growth rates, Medicaid spending per recipient in New York was still 
123 percent higher than in California in 2003. These cross-state differences may partially reflect 
differences in the characteristics of enrollees, which services are covered, the prices paid to 
health care providers, and the average intensity of treatment.  
                                                 
5 The corresponding growth in Medicaid spending per recipient when weighting each state by its Medicaid 
population in each year was a rise from $5,890 to $7,848.   12
While these cross-state differences in Medicaid spending per recipient are clearly of 
interest in their own right
6, in our empirical analyses below, we focus on within-state variation in 
Medicaid spending by investigating whether it increases or declines following the shift to MMC. 
 
3. Previous Literature 
  A large body of previous research has investigated the effect of HMOs and other 
managed care organizations on the quality and cost of medical care among the privately insured. 
The evidence on quality of care is mixed, with one influential survey article finding an 
approximately equal number of studies suggesting improvements as reductions (Miller and Luft, 
1997). Studies focusing on cost have generally found that managed care lowers health care 
spending in the private sector. These savings are often achieved primarily through reductions in 
provider prices rather than in reductions in the utilization of medical care (Cutler et al, 2000; Dor 
et al, 2004). Previous evidence also suggests that managed care was more successful in reducing 
costs during the 1990s than in more recent years, with one article referring to the period 
following this decade as the HMO “backlash period” (Shen and Melnick, 2006). 
  Much previous work has also explored the effect of managed care in the Medicaid 
program, where the growth in managed care enrollment was especially rapid during the 1990s. 
For a number of reasons, one might expect the effect of managed care to be different for 
Medicaid recipients than for the privately insured. First, Medicaid’s reimbursement rates for 
hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers are on average much less generous than the 
rates negotiated by private health insurers (Gruber, 2003; Garrett and Zuckerman, 2005). Thus 
there may be little room for these rates to fall further and induce large reductions in spending. 
                                                 
6 A large literature has explored the variation across geographic areas in Medicare spending per recipient (Fisher et 
al, 2003; Gottlieb et al, 2010). The variation shown in Table 4 for Medicaid is actually much greater than the 
corresponding variation for Medicare.   13
Second, Medicaid recipients “churn” in and out of the program more frequently than their 
counterparts with private insurance. To the extent that managed care in the private sector 
achieves savings by, for example, encouraging preventive care up front to reduce hospitalizations 
in the future, the Medicaid program may not benefit from those savings if the person is no longer 
enrolled. Third, the efficiency of care delivered by fee-for-service Medicaid may differ from that 
in the private sector. If, for example, Medicaid recipients receive more unnecessary services or 
care from costly sources such as emergency rooms than their counterparts in the private sector, 
there may be room for even greater cost savings.  
Research examining the effect of Medicaid managed care has tended to focus on quality 
and utilization measures such as infant health outcomes, ER visits, and preventable 
hospitalizations (Kaestner et al, 2002; Howell et al, 2004; Aizer et al, 2007). The results from 
this literature, consistent with the evidence for the private sector, are mixed. Another body of 
research has explored the effect of MMC on the composition of medical care, with some studies 
finding a reduction in the amount of care delivered in the hospital and a corresponding increase 
in the amount of care in outpatient settings (Bindman et al, 2005; Basu et al, 2004; Baker and 
Afendulis, 2005; Currie and Fahr, 2005). 
One especially relevant study from this prior literature used data from four rounds of the 
Community Tracking Study (CTS) to estimate the effect of Medicaid managed care on various 
measures of health care utilization (Herring and Adams, 2011). The authors take this analysis 
one step further by exploring the effect of Medicaid managed care on expenditures. However, 
because the CTS data does not contain information on health care spending, the authors must 
simulate it using data from another source (the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey) that allows 
them to estimate the average impact of each type of utilization on total spending. These   14
estimated effects are then multiplied by the corresponding individual-specific quantities for each 
type of service and aggregated by the person. As the authors note, they “measure the potential 
effect on state program expenditures,” which is certainly an important outcome variable. But to 
the extent that MMC plans contract with different providers, negotiate different provider 
reimbursement rates, or have different administrative costs than fee-for-service Medicaid, this 
approach may provide a misleading estimate of the effect of MMC on actual Medicaid spending. 
  Relatively few studies have investigated the effect of MMC enrollment on actual 
Medicaid expenditures. One study examined this issue in the state of California by exploiting 
variation across counties during the 1993 to 2001 period in the timing of mandates requiring 
certain categories of Medicaid recipients to enroll in an HMO (Duggan, 2004). The results from 
this study demonstrated that the policy-induced shift of Medicaid recipients into managed care 
resulted in a substantial increase in Medicaid spending in the state of California. In contrast, a 
recent survey article prepared for America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) found that MMC 
achieved cost savings in several states during the 1990s (Lewin Group, 2009). Virtually all of the 
studies of Medicaid spending cited in this survey article focused on just one state.
7. 
  No previous study has exploited the considerable variation across states with respect to 
Medicaid managed care policy to estimate the effect of MMC on Medicaid expenditures. This is 
in some respects surprising given the importance of the Medicaid program to both the federal 
budget and to individual state budgets and given the increase in MMC enrollment since the early 
1990s. Indeed, there are now more than 35 million U.S. residents in some form of Medicaid 
managed care, and this number is likely to grow substantially in the near future as a result of 
                                                 
7 The one exception to this among the articles cited in the survey is a study by Mathematica, which examines the 
issue for 5 states over a 3 to 6 year period during the mid-1990s. Interestingly, the authors of this study “concluded 
that (MMC) had little effect on state expenditures.” This study, like virtually all of the other studies cited in this 
Lewin Group report, was not published in a peer-reviewed journal.   15
additional policy changes requiring MMC enrollment and because of the PPACA-induced 
increase in Medicaid enrollment that will begin in 2014.
8  
In the pages that follow, we aim to fill this gap in the literature by combining a unique 
data set compiled by the Urban Institute on state and local-level MMC mandates with CMS data 
on state Medicaid expenditures. We focus on the 1991 to 2003 period, when the fraction of 
Medicaid recipients enrolled in managed care increased more than fivefold. 
 
4. The Effect of State and Local Mandates on MMC Enrollment 
This section outlines our strategy for using the presence of a state or local MMC mandate 
as an instrumental variable for Medicaid managed care enrollment. We begin by summarizing 
why an instrument is necessary in our application. 
 
A. The Endogeneity of Voluntary MMC Enrollment 
At the individual level, Medicaid spending varies substantially across individuals as a 
function of observable factors such as age, basis of eligibility, and state of residence and 
unobservable factors such as illness severity. Isolating the effect of MMC from these other 
factors is difficult if individuals have the option to enroll in Medicaid managed care plans.  For 
example, health insurers may find it optimal to target marketing to Medicaid recipients with 
relatively low costs, conditional on their observable characteristics, given that they are paid a 
fixed amount per enrollee per month. Similarly, individuals with higher utilization may prefer to 
remain in traditional fee-for-service Medicaid, where they may face fewer restrictions on the 
quantity of care that they receive or may have long-standing relationships with certain health 
                                                 
8 CMS projects that more than one-fourth of U.S. residents will be insured by Medicaid in 2014 and that Medicaid 
spending will exceed expenditures by the Medicare program in each year from 2016 through 2019 (CMS, 2010).   16
care providers. On the other hand, these same recipients may have more to gain from better 
coordination of their medical care, and thus may prefer to “opt in” to voluntary managed care 
plans. Thus it is theoretically ambiguous whether healthier (low-cost) Medicaid recipients would 
be more likely to “opt in” to a voluntary MMC program.
9 
Previous work on Medicaid managed care in the state of New York found that Medicaid 
recipients who voluntarily enrolled in MMC differed on both observable and unobservable 
dimensions from those remaining in fee-for-service (Glied et al, 1997). For example, MMC 
enrollees were much more likely to be in good or excellent health than those in traditional 
Medicaid. The authors conclude that “selection affects estimates of utilization savings between 
managed care and fee-for-service” in Medicaid. More recent work for the Medicare program, 
which does not require managed care enrollment, also indicates that healthier recipients are 
significantly more likely to join managed care plans (Brown et al, 2011). To the extent that the 
individuals who voluntarily enroll in MMC differ from their observably similar counterparts who 
remain in fee-for-service, a plausibly exogenous source of variation in MMC enrollment can be 
used to estimate its effect on spending or other outcome variables of interest. 
 
B. State and Local MMC Mandates 
  As discussed above, virtually every state now requires at least some of its Medicaid 
recipients to enroll in managed care plans.  These mandates typically vary by geography and/or 
by basis of Medicaid eligibility. For example beginning in the spring of 1994, individuals who 
qualified for Medicaid through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, now 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) in California’s Sacramento County were required to 
                                                 
9 These same endogeneity concerns would exist at the state level as well. If, for example, a state’s Medicaid 
recipients were becoming unobservably healthier (or sicker) over time because of changes in state outreach efforts, 
eligibility rules, or economic conditions, one might find a mechanical change in the share in MMC.   17
enroll in a Medicaid managed care plan. Elderly and disabled Medicaid recipients in Sacramento 
had the option to enroll but were not required to do so.  Previous work used county-level MMC 
mandates as a plausibly exogenous source of variation to estimate the effect of MMC enrollment 
on Medicaid spending in the state of California (Duggan, 2004).  
The current study extends this approach by using data on MMC mandates and Medicaid 
spending for all fifty states during the period when MMC enrollment experienced most of its 
growth. As shown in Table 2, the vast majority of states had no MMC mandates in effect at the 
beginning of our study period in 1991. This changed significantly during the next twelve years, 
so that by 2003 all but six states required at least some of their Medicaid recipients to enroll in a 
managed care plan.  In 2003, we estimate that 77.9 percent of Medicaid recipients resided in a 
county with an MMC mandate, versus just 5.9 percent in 1991. From 1991 to 2003, the fraction 
of Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC plans increased from 10.6 percent to 58.4 percent. 
  To investigate whether and to what extent the mandates influenced MMC enrollment, we 
use thirteen years of state-level data when estimating specifications of the following type: 
(1) MMCkt = t + k +  * Mandatekt +  * Xkt + t * k + kt 
In this specification, k and t index states and years, respectively. MMCkt represents the fraction 
of state k’s Medicaid recipients enrolled in managed care in year t, while Mandatekt equals our 
estimate of the fraction of state k’s Medicaid recipients residing in a county with an MMC 
mandate. Regarding this latter variable, we do not have county-level Medicaid enrollment for 
most of our study period. Thus to estimate the share of a state’s Medicaid recipients residing in a 
county with an MMC mandate, we weight each county by its share of the state population in   18
each year
10. In this specification, we also include some controls for the characteristics of each 
state’s Medicaid recipients, such as the fraction who are under the age of 15 and the fraction who 
are elderly (65 and older), in the vector Xkt. The specification also includes 13 year fixed effects 
(t) to control for common changes throughout the U.S. in MMC enrollment. The vector k 
represents a full set of state fixed effects, and these are also interacted with the year to construct 
a full set of state-specific linear time trends. 
  The parameter of particular interest in equation (1) is , which captures the relationship 
between the share of a state’s Medicaid recipients residing in counties with MMC mandates and 
the fraction actually enrolled in MMC. The key assumption that is necessary to assign a causal 
interpretation to  is that the MMC mandates are, after controlling for the characteristics of a 
state’s Medicaid recipients, state fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends, orthogonal to 
other unobserved determinants of MMC enrollment. If, for example, states tended to implement 
MMC mandates in counties where they expected voluntary MMC enrollment to decline, this 
would lead to a biased estimate of the average causal impact of the mandates. 
 
C. The Effect of MMC Mandates on MMC Enrollment 
  Table 5 summarizes the results from several specifications similar to (1). The first (not 
numbered) column in this table displays the mean and standard deviation of several explanatory 
variables that we utilize.  The first variable is simply the share of Medicaid recipients with an 
MMC mandate in their county as described above.  The second explanatory variable is similarly 
defined, but includes only those MMC mandates requiring enrollment in an HMO or similar “at-
risk” prepaid health plan. In many counties, Medicaid recipients were given the option to enroll 
                                                 
10 Our results, which we summarize below, are very similar if we instead weight by the county’s share of the state’s 
low-income population or if we use the county population for just one specific year rather than allowing this 
population to change over time. See the Data Appendix for more details on our variable construction.   19
in an alternative form of managed care, such as primary care case management, rather than being 
required to enroll in an HMO.
11 A comparison of the average for this variable (0.242) and the 
average for the broader mandate variable (0.532) reveals that slightly less than half of the 
population living in a county with a mandate was required to enroll in an HMO. The other three 
explanatory variables are the share of Medicaid recipients between the ages of 0 and 14, the 
share aged 65 and up, and the share who qualify for Medicaid because of disability. 
  The first specification summarized in this table includes the key explanatory variable 
along with just state and year fixed effects. Standard errors in this table and all subsequent ones 
are clustered by state to account for the possibility of within-state interdependence in the 
residuals due to serial correlation (Bertrand et al, 2004). The statistically significant estimate of 
0.465 for  suggests that, for every 100 Medicaid recipients “exposed” to an MMC mandate, 
approximately 47 enroll in MMC. This estimate is precisely estimated (with a t-statistic of 9.5), 
is very similar to the analogous one from previous work on California’s Medicaid managed care 
experience (Duggan, 2004), and is virtually unchanged in the next specification when the 
controls for the characteristics of Medicaid recipients are added. Interestingly, the estimated 
effects for the age and eligibility distribution are not precisely estimated, with this partly 
reflecting the fact that there is relatively little within-state variation in these variables. 
  The specification summarized in the column (3) includes state-specific time trends, and 
here the estimate for  declines somewhat to 0.374, though it remains precisely estimated. In the 
next specification, we add as a control the share of Medicaid recipients with an HMO mandate. 
The small and statistically insignificant estimate of 0.057 for the coefficient on this variable 
                                                 
11 Counties can either require enrollment in an HMO-type plan, enrollment in a PCCM-type plan, or give recipients 
the option between the two plan types. The first type of mandate is the most common, and an approximately equal 
share of Medicaid recipients are exposed to the second and third types of mandate.   20
indicates that the HMO mandate does not on average have a very different effect from the other 
types of mandates on the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC.  
Columns (5) and (6) in this same table summarize the results from analogous 
specifications in which the outcome variables are the share enrolled in PCCM and the share 
enrolled in HMOs. These two variables are defined so that they sum to the managed care 
variable employed in the four previous specifications. The statistically significant estimate of 
0.338 for  in the PCCM specification indicates that MMC mandates do, on average, lead to 
substantial increases in PCCM enrollment. However, the statistically significant estimate of -
0.372 for the HMO mandate coefficient demonstrates that this effect is restricted to those 
mandates that do not require HMO enrollment. This is as one would expect, as an HMO mandate 
would not typically lead to more PCCM enrollment. This general pattern is reversed in the next 
specification. More specifically, the estimate of 0.017 for  and of 0.429 for the HMO mandate 
coefficient indicate that only the latter type of mandate leads to increases in HMO enrollment. 
These findings support the accuracy of the mandate variables. 
  Taken together, the results in this section demonstrate that the MMC mandates 
implemented by state and local governments during our study period led to significant increases 
in MMC enrollment. From 1991 to 2003, the fraction of Medicaid recipients with a mandate in 
their county increased from 5.9 percent to 77.9 percent. Multiplying the increase in this share by 
our estimate of the average effect of the mandates on MMC enrollment in the third specification 
(0.374), we estimate that the mandates induced a 26.9 percentage point increase in MMC 
enrollment. This represents more than half of the actual increase of 47.8 percentage points during 
our study period.  
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5. The Effect of MMC Enrollment on Medicaid Expenditures 
  As shown in Table 3, the shift from fee-for-service to managed care within the Medicaid 
program during our study period was associated with a significant shift in the composition of 
Medicaid spending. In the twelve years from 1991 to 2003, payments to managed care 
organizations grew by an average of 23.7 percent per year (from $4.2 billion to $54.0 billion) 
versus just 5.4 percent annually for all other Medicaid spending. As a result, payments to HMOs 
and other MCOs rose from 2.8 percent of Medicaid spending in 1991 to 16.5 percent by 2003.  
This 2003 expenditure share is substantially below the corresponding share of Medicaid 
recipients enrolled in MMC for three reasons. First, approximately one-fourth of the MMC 
enrollment was in primary care case management programs, in which most Medicaid spending 
continues to be paid directly to health care providers on a fee-for-service basis. Second, the 
higher cost Medicaid recipients such as the elderly and disabled are typically kept within states’ 
fee-for-service Medicaid programs. And third, many state Medicaid programs “carve out” 
services such as long-term care from their MMC programs, so that even for HMO enrollees some 
of the spending would still be paid directly to health care providers on a fee-for-service basis. 
We begin our expenditure analyses by estimating the effect of MMC enrollment on the 
share of Medicaid spending paid to MMC organizations versus directly to health care providers. 
This sheds some light on the extent to which MMC could plausibly have affected total Medicaid 
spending. To do this, we use the mandate variables described above as instrumental variables for 
the share of a state’s Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC.  The specifications summarized in 
columns (3), (4), and (6) of Table 5 represent our “first-stage” in the IV specifications below. 
The key assumption of our empirical approach is that, after controlling for state fixed 
effects, state-specific linear time trends, and the other explanatory variables described above, the   22
timing of the MMC mandates is unrelated to unobserved factors that would influence the 
composition or level of total Medicaid spending in a state.  If, for example, states tend to shift 
their Medicaid recipients into MMC plans in response to previous or expected future increases in 
Medicaid spending, our estimates could be biased. 
  While it is not possible to rule out all possible sources of omitted variable bias, we test 
our key identifying assumption in a number of ways. First, we explore whether the MMC 
mandates are systematically related with total Medicaid enrollment.
12 If state policymakers were 
responding to projected enrollment-induced increases in program expenditures by shifting more 
of their beneficiaries into MMC plans, one would expect to estimate a positive value for µ2 in the 
following specification: 
(2) Mandatekt = t + k +  * Log(Medicaid Recipientskt) + t * k + kt 
Note that in this specification, the outcome variable is the fraction of Medicaid recipients with an 
MMC mandate in their county while the key explanatory variable is (the log of) the number of 
Medicaid recipients. Our estimate for  from this specification is small in magnitude (.003) and 
statistically insignificant (p-value of 0.988), thus providing little support for the hypothesis that 
state policymakers responded to Medicaid enrollment increases by shifting more of their 
recipients into managed care plans. 
  We next investigate whether the mandates are driven by past increases in Medicaid 
expenditures by estimating specifications of the following type: 
(3) Mandatekt = t + k +  * Log(Medicaid Spendingk,t-1) + t * k + kt 
                                                 
12 We take the log of Medicaid enrollment given the very large differences across states in Medicaid enrollment. For 
example in 2003, Medicaid enrollment in California was 6.27 million versus just 53.8 thousand in North Dakota. 
Thus in specification (2), year effects control for common proportional changes in Medicaid enrollment, while state-
specific linear trends allow for a constant growth rate in enrollment. For the same reasons in our analyses of total 
Medicaid spending, we take the log of this variable.   23
To the extent that state policymakers respond to increases in their Medicaid spending by shifting 
more of their recipients into managed care plans in the future, one would expect to obtain a 
positive estimate for . However, we once again obtain a small and statistically insignificant 
estimate (of .028 with a p-value of 0.862), suggesting that the mandates are not being driven by 
accelerations in state Medicaid spending. 
 
A. The Effect of MMC Enrollment on the Composition of Medicaid Spending 
  Table 6 summarizes the results from specifications that investigate the effect of the 
mandate-induced increases in MMC enrollment on the composition of Medicaid spending. For 
example, the first column summarizes the estimates from this specification, in which the 
outcome variable is the share of a state’s Medicaid spending being paid to hospitals, physicians, 
and other health care providers: 
(4) ProviderSharekt = t + k +  * MMCkt +  * Xkt + t * k + kt 
We instrument for MMCkt using the fraction with a mandate (see the first stage specification 3 
from Table 5). To the extent that MMC mandates cause a shift in Medicaid spending from health 
care providers to managed care plans, one would expect a negative estimate for . Given that (1) 
MMC enrollees tend to have lower costs on average than their counterparts who remain in fee-
for-service and (2) more than one-fourth of MMC enrollment is in primary care case 
management, one would expect the magnitude of this estimate to be substantially less than one. 
Consistent with this, the statistically significant estimate for  displayed in column (1) is -0.125. 
  As discussed above, managed care programs that utilize PCCM are unlikely to shift a 
large share of payments from providers to insurers. However, HMOs typically coordinate and 
finance most of the medical care for their enrollees, so one would expect HMO enrollment to   24
induce a substantial shift. To investigate the difference between these two forms of managed 
care, we add a control for the share of a state’s Medicaid recipients in a Medicaid HMO in the 
next specification.  We instrument for this and for the fraction enrolled in any form of MMC 
with the same two mandate variables described above (see the corresponding first stage 
specifications 4 and 6 in Table 5). 
  As shown in the second column of Table 6, there is a strong negative relationship 
between the share of payments going to health care providers and Medicaid HMO enrollment. 
The significantly negative coefficient estimate of -0.382 for  suggests that, for each 10 
percentage point increase in the share enrolled in Medicaid HMOs, there is approximately a 3.8 
percentage point decrease in the share of Medicaid spending going to providers.  There is no 
corresponding relationship for PCCM enrollment, which is consistent with the predictions above. 
  The next two columns of Table 6 reveal that the decline in provider share is almost 
perfectly offset by an increase in the share of Medicaid spending going to managed care plans. 
The share of Medicaid spending going to other sources, such as administrative costs or Medicare 
premiums (for Medicaid recipients dually eligible for Medicare), is not significantly related with 
the mandate-induced increases in MMC enrollment, as shown in columns 5 and 6. 
  If one assumes that Medicaid HMOs finance all of the medical care for their enrollees 
(and thus there is no fee-for-service spending on their behalf), then the estimate of -0.382 
suggests that HMO enrollees are much less expensive than the average Medicaid recipient. 
Suppose, for example, that half of the Medicaid recipients in a state are shifted into Medicaid 
HMOs. The statistically significant point estimates of -0.382 in column 2 and of 0.388 in column 
4 suggest that approximately 20 percent of Medicaid spending would be shifted from providers 
to insurers. In this example, the other half of recipients remaining in fee-for-service would   25
account for 80 percent of spending, and thus the Medicaid HMO enrollees would on average be 
just one-fourth as expensive. This is plausible given that the elderly and disabled, for whom per-
recipient Medicaid spending is several times more expensive, typically remained in FFS. 
  Table 7 displays the results from analogous specifications for specific types of health care 
providers. For example, the results displayed in specifications (1a) and (1b) reveal that the share 
of Medicaid spending paid to hospitals is significantly negatively related with the MMC share 
and that this relationship is especially strong for Medicaid HMOs. Among the other health care 
providers, the estimates are negative in most cases, though are typically significant only for 
Medicaid HMOs. Interestingly, there is no significant relationship between MMC enrollment and 
the share of Medicaid spending paid to intermediate and long-term care facilities. This is 
consistent with the evidence cited above, namely that the elderly and disabled have typically 
remained in fee-for-service Medicaid. 
  Taken together, the results in this subsection reveal that the policy-induced shift of 
Medicaid recipients from fee-for-service into Medicaid managed care has resulted in a shift of 
program expenditures from providers to insurers. Of course, many of these same providers 
ultimately receive the payments disbursed to health insurers. Interestingly, this shift in the 
composition of Medicaid spending is only present for Medicaid HMOs. Furthermore, revenues 
for certain categories of health care providers, such as long-term care facilities, have been 
relatively unaffected by Medicaid managed care. The next subsection explores whether the 
mandate-induced shift from fee-for-service to MMC has affected total Medicaid spending. 
 
B. The Effect of MMC Enrollment on Total Medicaid Spending   26
The typical motivation for shifting Medicaid recipients from fee-for-service into 
Medicaid managed care is that it will lead to improved access and quality of care for Medicaid 
recipients while simultaneously allowing states to reduce Medicaid spending. While several case 
studies of specific states suggest the possibility of cost savings (Lewin Group, 2009), no 
systematic analysis of a large sample of states has ever been conducted. The analysis in this 
section aims to fill this gap by using CMS data on total annual Medicaid spending in each state 
from 1991 through and including 2003.   
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worth considering the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of using aggregate data to answer this question. Previous work on this same issue for 
California’s Medicaid program used individual-level claims and enrollment data for a random 20 
percent sample of the state’s Medicaid population during the 1993 to 2001 period (Duggan, 
2004). One advantage of this approach was that it allowed the author to use individual fixed 
effects for a large sample of program participants and thus estimate whether spending for the 
same individual increased or declined following a mandate-induced shift into MMC.
13 However, 
one important disadvantage was that it excluded certain categories of Medicaid spending such as 
administrative costs, which are not included in claims data and might plausibly change following 
a shift to MMC. Similarly, this previous study ignored the possibility of general equilibrium 
effects – namely that shifting Medicaid recipients into MMC might affect how health care 
providers treated those remaining in FFS. The aggregate state data utilized in the present study 
includes a more comprehensive measure of Medicaid spending and would capture those general 
equilibrium effects.
14  
                                                 
13 With a sample of more than one million Medicaid recipients, an additional benefit of the individual-level data was 
that it yielded relatively precise estimates. 
14 It is also worth noting that, in order to perform an analysis similar to the California one for the entire U.S., it 
would be necessary to obtain Medicaid claims data for all fifty states, as CMS does not currently produce a random   27
  To estimate the effect of the mandate-induced increases in MMC enrollment on Medicaid 
spending, we begin by estimating specifications of the following type: 
(5) Log(McdSpendkt) = t + k +  * Log(McdRecipskt) +  * MMCkt +  * Xkt + t * k + kt 
In this regression, the outcome variable is the log of Medicaid spending in state k and in year t. 
We control for the same explanatory variables described above and also for the log of the 
number of Medicaid recipients.
15 State fixed effects control for time invariant differences across 
states in the level of Medicaid spending, while state-specific linear time trends control for 
differences across states in the average growth rate of Medicaid spending.  
  Table 8 summarizes the results from this set of analyses. The first specification 
summarized in column (1) is a reduced form estimate of the fraction of Medicaid recipients 
residing in a county with an MMC mandate. The point estimate of -0.005 for  is small in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant, suggesting that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
fraction of recipients with an MMC mandate in their county would affect total Medicaid 
spending by less than 0.1 percent.
16 The IV estimate for the spending effect of the fraction 
enrolled in MMC is summarized in the next column. As one would expect given the first-stage 
estimates described above, the magnitude of this IV estimate is higher than the reduced form 
estimate. But it is also statistically insignificant, suggesting that a 10 percentage point increase in 
MMC enrollment is associated with just a 0.1 percent change in total Medicaid spending in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
sample for Medicaid as they do for Medicare. This no doubt also partially explains why many issues that have been 
researched extensively for Medicare, such as variation across geographic areas in spending and treatment patterns, 
have been virtually ignored for the Medicaid program. 
15 An alternative to this model would be to define the dependent variable as the log of Medicaid spending per 
recipient. The model above is more flexible as it does not impose a one-for-one relationship between the number of 
recipients and Medicaid spending. It could be, for example, that marginal enrollees have higher or lower costs than 
the average, and this specification allows for this possibility. 
16 The corresponding OLS estimate, in which the actual share in MMC (instead of the share with an MMC mandate) 
is used as the explanatory variable, is .053 with a t-statistic of 1.26.   28
state. These findings provide little support for the hypothesis that the shift to Medicaid managed 
care reduced the strain on the typical state budget. 
  The next two columns summarize the analogous reduced form and IV estimates that 
differentiate between Medicaid HMO enrollment and other forms of Medicaid managed care.  
All of the estimates in these columns are statistically insignificant, though the signs are 
interesting. For example, the point estimates in the IV specification in column 4 suggest that 
PCCM may lead to a modest reduction in Medicaid spending while the opposite is true for 
Medicaid HMO enrollment. More specifically, the point estimate of -.060 for the main MMC 
mandate coefficient suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in PCCM enrollment is 
associated with a 0.6 percent reduction in Medicaid expenditures. In contrast, adding this 
coefficient estimate to the one of .108 for the Medicaid HMO mandate coefficient estimate 
suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in HMO enrollment is associated with a 0.5 percent 
increase in Medicaid spending. It is not implausible that PCCM could lower Medicaid spending, 
as primary care physicians may be able to help Medicaid recipients increase the efficiency of 
their care despite not being at financial risk. However, it is important to emphasize that these 
estimated effects are only suggestive as neither coefficient is statistically significant. 
  As discussed above, one possible source of heterogeneity in the effect of MMC 
contracting is the generosity of Medicaid provider reimbursement relative to reimbursement by 
commercial insurers. If, for example, Medicaid pays providers much lower rates than private 
insurers, then it may simply not be possible for these insurers to lower Medicaid spending (even 
if they reduce utilization to some degree). If, on the other hand, Medicaid’s reimbursement is 
close to that by private insurers, then there may be some scope to reduce Medicaid spending 
through reductions in utilization of care.   29
  To test this hypothesis, we next augment these specifications by interacting the MMC 
mandate variable with an index for the generosity of a state’s Medicaid reimbursement 
(MC_Index) relative to private insurers. This data was constructed using state Medicaid 
reimbursement rates in 1989, two years prior to the start of our study period, and represents the 
average ratio of Medicaid to commercial reimbursement for a newborn delivery, which is the 
most common type of inpatient admission among Medicaid recipients.
17 The mean value of 
MC_Index is 0.56, implying that Medicaid was 44 percent less generous than commercial 
reimbursement in the average state. This measure does not vary within a state over time in our 
analyses and we de-mean it in all specifications.  
There is substantial heterogeneity across states with respect to this index of relative state 
Medicaid reimbursement, with the ninetieth percentile state at 0.88 and the tenth percentile state 
at just 0.36. Two states have a value of exactly 1.00, implying that Medicaid is as generous as 
commercial insurers there, and no states are above this level. Thus according to this measure, 
Medicaid was not more generous than commercial health insurance in any state around the 
beginning of our study period. 
  The results displayed in the fifth column of Table 8 strongly suggest that the generosity 
of a state’s Medicaid reimbursement, relative to private insurers, is a significant determinant of 
the spending effects of MMC contracting.
18 More specifically, the statistically significant 
estimate of -0.251 for the interaction between the mandate variable and MC_Index indicates that 
                                                 
17 See Schwartz et al (1991) for a detailed description of this data. Neither Arizona nor Wyoming were included in 
this survey. Also, this data is for just one year and is not updated over time. While national analyses of Medicaid 
reimbursement generosity have been conducted since this study appeared, virtually no studies aim to measure this on 
a state-by-state basis relative to commercial insurance. We therefore use this relatively old data, which was 
constructed just prior to the start of our study period. 
18 To investigate whether states with higher Medicaid provider reimbursement rates were more (or less) likely to 
shift Medicaid recipients into MMC plans, we regressed the twelve-year change in the state-level MMC mandate on 
this index. The point estimate was negative (suggesting that states with more generous provider reimbursement were 
less likely to shift recipients into MMC) though statistically insignificant with a t-statistic of -1.22.   30
MMC lowered spending by significantly more in states with generous provider reimbursement. 
This suggests that, if Medicaid provider rates are particularly low, then Medicaid managed care 
is unlikely to reduce spending. The estimate of -0.251 suggests that changing the index by one 
standard deviation (0.19) is associated with a 4.8 percentage point change in the reduced-form 
effect of the mandate. Given that MC_Index is demeaned, the point estimate of -.012 for the 
main mandate variable suggests that the effect of MMC contracting for a state with average 
Medicaid reimbursement generosity is very small. 
In the next specification, we investigate whether this effect is specific to HMOs by 
interacting the Medicaid reimbursement index with both the main mandate variable and the 
HMO mandate variable. Theoretically, one might expect the difference to be present only for 
HMOs, as state governments continue to directly reimburse health care providers under PCCM. 
On the other hand, a state with relatively generous Medicaid reimbursement may experience 
more overutilization under a fee-for-service system. Thus there may be more scope for primary 
care case managers to reduce utilization through better care coordination in such a state. It is 
therefore theoretically ambiguous whether the spending effect of generous Medicaid 
reimbursement would be restricted to HMOs or would also be present in states that used PCCM.  
The results summarized in the sixth column of Table 8 suggest that the effect of Medicaid 
provider reimbursement generosity is not significantly different for HMOs. More specifically, 
the estimate for the interaction between the MC_index and the HMO mandate variable is small 
in magnitude (.039) and statistically insignificant, while the point estimate for the coefficient on 
the interaction of this index with the main mandate variable is unchanged and remains 
statistically significant. This suggests that states that employ either HMO or PCCM contracting 
can achieve cost savings if a state has relatively high provider reimbursement.   31
In the next specification, we introduce an alternative estimate of Medicaid reimbursement 
generosity, which is the ratio of it to Medicare reimbursement.
19 The estimate for the interaction 
of this variable, which we label MM_Index, with the main mandate variable is small in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant. This finding, along with the similar one in the next 
specification when we include both mandate variables, suggests the generosity of Medicaid 
reimbursement relative to commercial insurers is the more important source of heterogeneity. 
Taken together, the results in this subsection suggest that, on average, MMC contracting 
did not lead to lower Medicaid spending during the 1991 through 2003 period. However, our 
findings do suggest that in states with relatively generous Medicaid reimbursement, contracting 
did achieve cost savings, while the opposite was true in states with less generous provider 
reimbursement. These findings underscore the importance of considering a state’s unique 
circumstances when considering the potential savings from shifting Medicaid recipients from 
fee-for-service into managed care plans. 
 
6. Discussion 
From 1991 to 2003, the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in HMOs and other 
managed care plans increased from 11 percent to 58 percent. These increases were largely driven 
by state and local mandates that required Medicaid recipients to enroll in a managed care plan. 
Using panel data for all 50 states and the District of Columbia over a thirteen-year period, the 
results in this paper suggest that shifting Medicaid recipients into managed care plans did not 
reduce Medicaid spending in the typical state. However, in states with relatively generous 
provider reimbursement rates, our results suggest that MMC contracting did reduce Medicaid 
                                                 
19 Our primary source for this ratio is Norton and Zuckerman (2002) and these ratios are for 1998. However, the data 
are missing for several states in this survey, and thus we supplement it with data from Zuckerman et al (2009) for 
2008. We scale down these later values to account for the increase in the average ratio from 1998 to 2008.   32
spending below what it otherwise would have been. Our findings suggest that the opposite was 
true in states with low provider reimbursement rates at the start of our study period. 
  The fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in MMC plans has increased only gradually 
during the last several years, growing from 58 percent in 2003 to 71 percent by 2008. However, 
recent survey evidence suggests that a large number of states are planning to expand the reach of 
their MMC programs in the near future. This shift is likely to focus relatively more on elderly 
and disabled Medicaid recipients, who were largely exempted from the MMC mandates during 
the 1990s and early 2000s. While representing just one-fourth of Medicaid recipients, this group 
accounts for approximately two-thirds of Medicaid spending. Thus the share of Medicaid 
spending paid to managed care plans may increase by substantially more than the share of 
Medicaid recipients in MMC plans in the near future. Of course, because aged and disabled 
Medicaid recipients differ in many respects from most of the Medicaid recipients directly 
affected by previous MMC mandates, our findings would not necessarily translate to this group.  
  Projections from CBO and CMS suggest that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act will increase the number of Medicaid recipients by between 16 million and 23 million by 
2015. Indeed, CMS projects that more than one-fourth of U.S. residents will be insured by 
Medicaid in 2014 (CMS, 2010). It is plausible that the vast majority of those newly eligible for 
Medicaid, which will include individuals without health insurance with family incomes below 
138 percent of the poverty line, will enroll in MMC plans.
20  
  For all of these reasons, it is plausible that the reach of Medicaid managed care will 
expand significantly in the years ahead.  How states can achieve greater success in their MMC 
programs with respect to improved quality and lower Medicaid spending represents an important 
                                                 
20 PPACA extended Medicaid to non-elderly U.S. residents with incomes at or below 133 percent of the federal 
poverty line (FPL). A provision of the subsequent Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 effectively 
changed that to 138 percent of FPL.   33
area for future research. For this it would be especially fruitful to obtain individual-level 
longitudinal data on MMC enrollment and Medicaid spending for a large number of states over a 
long time period, which would allow one to telescope in on specific geographic areas or on 
particular subpopulations within these states.   34
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Data Appendix 
This study utilized data on Medicaid expenditures, enrollment in Medicaid and in Medicaid 
managed care programs, and Medicaid demographic information from the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) and mandate data from the Urban Institute. 
Expenditure Data 
Medicaid expenditure data comes from the CMS-64 Reports (available here for 1997-2009: 
https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidBudgetExpendSystem/02_CMS64.asp), which contain state-level 
expenditures for relatively narrow service categories for each year.  These service categories 
were aggregated into broader categories as follows: 
Hospital spending: inpatient and outpatient hospital spending, including disproportionate share 
payments 
Physician: physician services, clinic services, labs and radiology, and other practitioners 
Long-term care: hospice, intermediate care facilities, and nursing care facilities 
Prescription drugs: prescription drug payments, net of manufacturer rebates 
Home Health: home and community based services and home health services 
Other providers: all other provider services, such as federally-qualified health centers and family 
planning services – excluding dental services or emergency services for undocumented 
immigrants 
Managed care: payments to physicians for primary care case management programs; capitated 
payments to managed care organizations, prepaid health plans, all-inclusive elderly plans; and 
other Medicaid health insurance payments 
Other expenditures: all other services such as administrative costs and premium and coinsurance 
payments on behalf of enrollees who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid 
Total expenditures include the sum total of all Medicaid expenditures, with the exception of 
dental expenditures and emergency services for undocumented immigrants; SCHIP expenditures 
are included in all of the above categories as applicable once the program began in 1998. 
Medicaid Enrollment and Demographic Data 
Both overall Medicaid and Medicaid managed care enrollment data as of June 30 come from the 
Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment Reports for the years 1991-2003 (The 2009 report is 
available here: http://www.cms.gov/medicaiddatasourcesgeninfo/04_mdmancrenrllrep.asp).    38
Overall MMC enrollment comes from the unduplicated total managed care enrollment figure.  
Before 1996, the unduplicated total was not reported, so it was constructed from summed 
enrollment in individual managed care plans, excluding prepaid health plans for carved out 
services such as diabetes, substance abuse, and mental health because these often enroll 
individuals who are also enrolled in comprehensive medical plans.  Dental managed care plans 
are excluded because these are inherently different from those offering medical services. 
Before 1996, the MMC Enrollment Reports did not report June 30 Medicaid enrollment.  In 
order to construct MMC penetration rates with a consistent base for each state, we estimated 
June 30 Medicaid enrollment for 1991-1995 using fiscal year Medicaid enrollment and the state-
specific ratio between June 30 enrollment and fiscal year enrollment for 1996.  Fiscal year 
Medicaid enrollment came from Medicaid Statistical Information Statistics reports (described 
here:  http://www.cms.gov/msis/).  For the handful of cases where constructed unduplicated 
managed care enrollment exceeded constructed Medicaid enrollment, the percent of Medicaid 
beneficiaries enrolled in managed care was capped at 100 percent. 
Medicaid demographic information on age and eligibility through blindness or disability status 
also came from the MSIS data reports.  In the early-1990s, these reports were filled out & 
entered into CMS systems by hand, and in a two cases there were clear instances of data entry 
being swapped between columns.  These instances are the following: 
‐  Arkansas: age 85+ and age unknown were swapped for 1991 and 1992 
‐  Connecticut: Eligibility through Blind/Disabled, Adults in FDC, and Title XIX were 
swapped in 1991 
Mandatory Managed Care Enrollment Policies 
The Urban Institute conducted surveys in 1998 and 2001 to determine what types of MMC 
policies existed for the welfare population in different geographic areas and years.  Their surveys 
differentiated between primary care case management programs and comprehensive managed 
care organization programs and between voluntary and mandatory programs of both types.  The 
resulting data set reports the existence of these managed care policies using binary variables for 
each county-year observation.  The 1998 survey is described further in Garrett, et al 2003, which 
uses survey data from 1991-1995 to study the effect of MMC on access and utilization. 
State-level mandate variables were constructed by combining these indicator variables with 
county-level population data.  For example, if a state had two counties – one with 70 people and 
a mandatory managed care policy, and the other with 30 people and no managed care policy – 
the state-level variable, percent mandatory, would equal 70 percent because 70 percent of the 
state’s population lives in a county with a mandatory managed care policy.   39
In order to capture additional years of data beyond the MMC expansions in the 1990s, the 
Medicaid mandate variables were extended to 2003.  There were few changes in MMC mandates 
between 1999 and 2001, and the plan-level MMC enrollment report tables for 2002 and 2003 
were used to identify which states expanded or contracted the geographic reach of their MMC 
policies.  For example, Kentucky’s mandatory PCCM program began operating statewide in 
2002 and Mississippi dropped its mandatory PCCM program in 2002. Our empirical results are 
very similar if we restrict attention to the 1991 to 2001 period. 
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
YearTotal Medicaid % Residing in Cnty % Residing in Cnty
Enrollment in Millions % in MMC % in Risk / HMO with MMC Mandate with HMO Mandate
1991 25.3 10.6% 7.4% 5.9% 3.0%
1992 28 1 12 7% 86 % 10 9% 30 %
Table 1: % of Medicaid Recipients in Medicaid Managed Care and with MMC Mandates: 1991-2003
1992 28.1 12.7% 8.6% 10.9% 3.0%
1993 30.5 15.8% 10.9% 12.9% 3.1%
1994 31.7 23.3% 14.6% 22.4% 6.8%
1995 32.3 32.9% 21.5% 35.3% 11.2%
1996 32.2 38.9% 26.5% 44.6% 17.1%
1997 30.8 47.5% 33.4% 55.3% 24.6%
1998 30.0 52.5% 39.2% 70.3% 35.4%
1999 30.9 55.0% 41.1% 75.9% 38.9%
2000 32.7 54.9% 40.7% 78.3% 42.9%
2001 35.5 56.0% 41.2% 78.7% 42.0%
2002 39.1 56.9% 42.6% 77.2% 41.9%
2003 41.8 58.4% 43.7% 77.9% 41.3% % % % %
Source: Enrollment in Medicaid and Medicaid managed care programs as of June 30 for each year come from Medicaid Managed Care
Enrollment Reports for the years 1991-2003.  June 30 Medicaid enrollment was not reported for the years 1991-1995; it was instead 
constructed using fiscal year enrollment from the Medicaid Statistical Information Statistics reports for those years and the ratio of fiscal 
year enrollment to June 30 enrollment for 1996.  Both reports are CMS publications.  Population shares living in counties with MMC 
mandates are constructed from Urban Institute mandate data and Census Bureau population data. ppState 1991 2003 1991 2003
Alabama 4.1% 53.2% 0.0% 100.0%
Alaska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Arizona 100.0% 89.7% 100.0% 100.0%
Arkansas 0.0% 67.1% 0.0% 100.0%
C lif i 10 6% 52 0% 34 % 86 3%
% Medicaid Recips in MMC % in County with MMC Mandate
Table 2: MMC Enrollment and MMC Mandate Variation by State in 1991 and 2003
California 10.6% 52.0% 3.4% 86.3%
Colorado 53.7% 79.4% 0.0% 100.0%
Connecticut 0.0% 72.7% 0.0% 100.0%
Delaware 0.0% 71.3% 0.0% 100.0%
District of Columbia 10.6% 66.6% 0.0% 100.0%
Florida 17.4% 61.2% 0.0% 100.0%
Georgia 0.0% 83.7% 0.0% 100.0%
Hawaii 1.4% 78.8% 0.0% 100.0%
Idaho 0.0% 64.5% 0.0% 54.1%
Illinois 90 % 87 % 00 % 00 % Illinois 9.0% 8.7% 0.0% 0.0%
Indiana 0.3% 71.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Iowa 22.7% 91.5% 33.1% 93.5%
Kansas 31.1% 57.3% 53.3% 100.0%
Kentucky 43.0% 92.3% 97.8% 100.0%
Louisiana 0.0% 58.6% 0.0% 66.5%
Maine 0.0% 59.3% 0.0% 100.0%
Maryland 14.6% 68.5% 0.0% 100.0%
Massachusetts 8.4% 62.6% 0.0% 100.0%
Michigan 13.5% 99.4% 0.0% 100.0% g
Minnesota 17.1% 65.6% 30.8% 86.0%
Mississippi 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Missouri 11.7% 44.7% 12.3% 67.5%
Montana 0.0% 68.9% 0.0% 97.8%
Nebraska 0.0% 72.1% 0.0% 50.0%
Nevada 14.7% 45.7% 0.0% 70.3%
New Hampshire 4.4% 14.7% 0.0% 0.0%
New Jersey 1.0% 67.2% 0.0% 100.0%
New Mexico 38.8% 64.5% 0.0% 100.0%
% % % % New York 3.8% 52.5% 0.0% 44.5%
North Carolina 7.3% 69.7% 0.5% 100.0%
North Dakota 0.0% 66.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Ohio 18.4% 28.8% 5.3% 47.8%
Oklahoma 0.0% 68.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Oregon 27.6% 77.7% 0.0% 100.0%
Pennsylvania 13.2% 79.9% 0.0% 100.0%
Rhode Island 0.3% 66.8% 0.0% 100.0%
South Carolina 4.2% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0%
South Dakota 00 % 97 3% 00 % 100 0% South Dakota 0.0% 97.3% 0.0% 100.0%
Tennessee 3.1% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Texas 0.0% 41.7% 0.0% 69.7%
Utah 86.4% 86.4% 77.5% 75.8%
Vermont 0.0% 65.4% 0.0% 100.0%
Virginia 0.0% 45.0% 0.0% 86.8%
Washington 3.4% 80.7% 5.2% 81.0%
West Virginia 0.0% 51.1% 0.0% 100.0%
Wisconsin 26.4% 47.2% 27.0% 79.3%
Wyoming 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Wyoming 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Source: Enrollment in Medicaid and Medicaid managed care programs as of June 30 for each year 
come from Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment Reports for the years 1991-2003.  June 30 Medicaid 
enrollment was not reported for the years 1991-1995; it was instead constructed using fiscal year 
enrollment from the Medicaid Statistical Information Statistics reports for those years and the ratio of 
fiscal year enrollment to June 30 enrollment for 1996.  Both reports are CMS publications.  Population 
shares living in counties with MMC mandates are constructed from Urban Institute mandate data and 
Census Bureau population data.1991 1997 2003
Hospital $51,632 $59,446 $66,446
34.6% 26.7% 20.3%
Long and Intermediate Term Care $47,397 $59,179 $67,767
31 7% 26 6% 20 7%
Table 3: Composition of Medicaid Spending in 1991, 1997, and 2003
31.7% 26.6% 20.7%
Physician $13,129 $17,705 $19,946
8.8% 7.9% 6.1%
Prescription Drugs $8,868 $13,795 $32,005
5.9% 6.2% 9.8%
Home Health $4,396 $14,607 $26,808
2.9% 6.6% 8.2%
Mental Health $4,438 $9,179 $9,156
3.0% 4.1% 2.8%
All Other Providers $5,931 $13,425 $22,668
4.0% 6.0% 6.9%
Managed Care Payments $4,197 $21,873 $54,041 Managed Care Payments $4,197 $21,873 $54,041
2.8% 9.8% 16.5%
Administration $6,079 $7,669 $16,395
4.1% 3.4% 5.0%
Premiums / Coinsurance $0 $0 $4,433
0.0% 0.0% 1.4%
Medicare $3 227 $6 015 $8 109 Medicare $3,227 $6,015 $8,109
2.2% 2.7% 2.5%
Total Medicaid Spending $149,293 $222,893 $327,774
Dollar amounts in millions of 2010 dollars, adjusted using the BLS Consumer Price Index for 































New Hampshire $13,452 $12,736
New Jersey $9,311 $13,270
New Mexico $3,080 $6,108
New York $12,447 $13,350
North Carolina $6,228 $8,144




Pennsylvania $5 417 $10 758 Pennsylvania $5,417 $10,758
Rhode Island $8,175 $10,361
South Carolina $7,087 $5,012





Virginia $4,404 $7,745 g
Washington $5,405 $6,000
West Virginia $4,128 $7,768
Wisconsin $6,311 $8,124
Wyoming $5,270 $7,627
Dollar amounts in 2010 dollars. Source: CMS‐64 Medicaid Expenditure Reports and Medicaid 
enrollment data described in Table 2.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 All All All All PCCM HMO
% of State Pop in Mandatory MMC County 0.532 0.465*** 0.469*** 0.374*** 0.355*** 0.338*** 0.017
Table 5: The Impact of State and Local Medicaid Managed Care Mandates on MMC Enrollment
% of State Pop in Mandatory MMC County 0.532 0.465 0.469 0.374 0.355 0.338 0.017
(.442) (.049) (.050) (.066) (.062) (.041) (.045)
% of State Pop in Mandatory HMO County 0.242 0.057 -0.372*** 0.429***
(.382) (.073) (.036) (.059)
% Medicaid Recipients Ages 0-14 0.466 0.058 -0.437 -0.397 -0.022 -0.375
( 056) ( 299) ( 357) ( 372) ( 173) ( 262) (.056) (.299) (.357) (.372) (.173) (.262)
% Medicaid Recipients Ages 65+ 0.115 -0.106 0.297 0.285 -0.036 0.321
(.031) (.621) (.519) (.469) (.213) (.427)
% Medicaid Recipients Blind / Disabled 0.159 -0.292 0.213 0.247 0.057 0.190
(.042) (.456) (.389) (.386) (.192) (.395) () () () () () ()
# Observations 663 663 663 663 663 663 663
R-squared - 0.876 0.877 0.918 0.919 0.914 0.911
Mean of Dependent Variable - 0.424 0.424 0.424 0.424 0.156 0.268
Std Dev of Dependent Variable - 0.320 0.320 0.320 0.320 0.215 0.303
State Fixed Effects - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Time Trends? - No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
The data listed in the first (not numbered) column provide summary statistics for the explanatory variables. Results in columns numbered (1) through (6) 
summarize the results from OLS specifications of the percent of a state's Medicaid recipients in managed care plans on the percent of all state residents residing 
in a county with a Medicaid managed care mandate. Two mandate variables are considered - one that requires some managed care enrollment and another that 
requires HMO enrollment specifically Unit of observation is the state*year with years from 1991 through 2003 included and thus a total of 663 observations requires HMO enrollment specifically. Unit of observation is the state*year, with years from 1991 through 2003 included and thus a total of 663 observations. 
Standard errors are clustered by state and are included in parentheses.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% of Medicaid Recipients in Managed Care -0.125** 0.035 0.135*** -0.028 -0.011 -0.009
Table 6: IV Estimates of the Effect of MMC Enrollment on the Composition of Medicaid Spending
Provider Share Managed Care Share All Other Share
% of Medicaid Recipients in Managed Care 0.125 0.035 0.135 0.028 0.011 0.009
(.051) (.047) (.049) (.046) (.007) (.008)
% of Medicaid Recipients in HMOs -0.382*** 0.388*** -0.005
(.054) (.054) (.006)
% Medicaid Recipients Ages 0-14 0.507** 0.319* -0.492** -0.301 -0.015 -0.018
( 228) ( 186) ( 237) ( 185) ( 033) ( 032) (.228) (.186) (.237) (.185) (.033) (.032)
% Medicaid Recipients Ages 65+ 0.057 0.166 -0.024 -0.134 -0.031 -0.029
(.377) (.272) (.393) (.270) (.053) (.052)
% Medicaid Recipients Blind / Disabled 0.105 0.046 -0.142 -0.082 0.030 0.029
(.118) (.151) (.125) (.141) (.050) (.049) () () () () () ()
# Observations 663 663 663 663 663 663
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.829 0.829 0.095 0.095 0.076 0.076
Std Dev of Dependent Variable 0.149 0.149 0.142 0.142 0.023 0.023
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Time Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Results in columns numbered (1) through (6) summarize the results from IV specifications in which the dependent variables are the share of 
Medicaid spending paid to health care providers (columns 1 and 2), managed care plans (columns 3 and 4), and to administration and other sources 
(columns 5 and 6). The two mandate variables described in Table 5 are used as instruments for MMC enrollment. Specifications 3, 4, and 6 from 
Table 5 represent the first stage specifications for these IV estimates. Unit of observation is the state*year, with years from 1991 through 2003 
included and thus a total of 663 observations. Standard errors are clustered by state and are included in parentheses. included and thus a total of 663 observations. Standard errors are clustered by state and are included in parentheses.(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Hospital Physician LTC RX Home Health Other Providers
% of Medicaid Recipients in Managed Care -0.089** -0.022 -0.009 -0.011 -0.016 0.019
Table 7: IV Estimates of the Effect of MMC Enrollment on the Composition of Medicaid Spending
% of Medicaid Recipients in Managed Care 0.089 0.022 0.009 0.011 0.016 0.019
(.036) (.016) (.020) (.012) (.010) (.019)
# Observations 663 663 663 663 663 663
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.245 0.088 0.264 0.071 0.072 0.088
Std Dev of Dependent Variable 0.106 0.048 0.088 0.028 0.047 0.053
State FE's, Year FE's, State Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
Hospital Physician LTC RX Home Health Other Providers
% of Medicaid Recipients in Managed Care -0.018 0.016 0.005 0.010 -0.004 0.022
(.034) (.018) (.025) (.008) (.012) (.022)
% of Medicaid Recipients in HMOs -0.170*** -0.091*** -0.033 -0.050*** -0.028** -0.008
( 039) ( 024) ( 023) ( 012) ( 012) ( 019) (.039) (.024) (.023) (.012) (.012) (.019)
# Observations 663 663 663 663 663 663
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.245 0.088 0.264 0.071 0.072 0.088
Std Dev of Dependent Variable 0.106 0.048 0.088 0.028 0.047 0.053
State FE's, Year FE's, State Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Demographic Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Results in columns numbered (1a) through (6a) and (1b) through (6b) summarize the results from IV specifications in which the dependent variables are the 
share of Medicaid spending paid to six different types of health care providers. Specifications 3, 4, and 6 from Table 5 represent the first stage specifications for 
these IV estimates. Unit of observation is the state*year, with years from 1991 through 2003 included and thus a total of 663 observations. Standard errors are 
clustered by state and are included in parentheses.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS OLS OLS OLS
% of State Pop in Mandatory MMC County -0.005 -0.019 -0.012 -0.021 -0.003 -0.005
( 025) ( 027) ( 025) ( 027) ( 027) ( 026)
Table 8: The Impact of MMC Mandates and MMC Enrollment on State Medicaid Expenditures
(.025) (.027) (.025) (.027) (.027) (.026)
% in Mandatory MMC County * MC_Index -0.251** -0.251* -0.293**
(.115) (.129) (.134)
% in Mandatory MMC County * MM_Index -0.051 0.103
(.122) (.149)
% of Medicaid Recipients in Managed Care 0 014 0 060 % of Medicaid Recipients in Managed Care -0.014 -0.060
(.060) (.071)
% of State Pop in Mandatory HMO County 0.043 0.033
(.032) (.029)
% in Mandatory HMO County * MC_Index 0.039
(.115) ()
% of Medicaid Recipients in HMOs 0.108
(.070)
Log(Medicaid Recipients) 0.207*** 0.206*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.174*** 0.169*** 0.213*** 0.179***
(.058) (.052) (.058) (.051) (.055) (.055) (.062) (.058)
% Medicaid Recipients Ages 0-14 -0 384*- 0 392*- 0 357*- 0 340*- 0 411*- 0 386*- 0 419*- 0 445** % Medicaid Recipients Ages 01 4 0.384 0.392 0.357 0.340 0.411 0.386 0.419 0.445
(.223) (.211) (.206) (.189) (.216) (.200) (.225) (.218)
% Medicaid Recipients Ages 65+ 0.437 0.438 0.417 0.402 0.324 0.323 0.359 0.281
(.743) (.671) (.712) (.625) (.715) (.695) (.762) (.730)
% Medicaid Recipients Blind / Disabled 0.294 0.295 0.315 0.310 0.354 0.365 0.315 0.374
(.275) (.247) (.269) (.238) (.265) (.257) (.282) (.272)
# Observations 663 663 663 663 637 637 650 624
State FE's, Year FE's, State Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Results in columns numbered (1), (3) and (5) through (8) summarize the results from OLS specifications in which the dependent variable is the log of total Medicaid spending. Specifications (2) 
and (4) represent IV estimates with this same dependent variable. Specifications 3, 4, and 6 from Table 5 represent the first stage specifications for these IV estimates. Arizona and Wyoming are 
missing the MC_Index variable and Tennessee is missing the MM_Index variable. Thus the number of observations in specifications (5) through (8) are somewhat lower as a result. Unit of 
b ti i th t t * ith f 1991 th h 2003 i l d d d th t t l f 663 b ti i ifi ti (1) th h (4) d li htl f i ifi ti (5) th h (8) observation is the state*year, with years from 1991 through 2003 included and thus a total of 663 observations in specifications (1) through (4) and slightly fewer in specifications (5) through (8) 
because of missing data for MM_Index or MC_index. Standard errors are clustered by state and are included in parentheses.